Friday, July 11, 2025

Oops! Opposer Fails to Prove Statutory Standing: Submitting Ordinary Copy of Registration Not Enough

Waldencast UK Limited filed an opposition to registration of the mark COATER for various skin care products, alleging likelihood of confusion with its registered mark COATS for non-medicated cosmetics. Neither party submitted testimony or other evidence and only Opposer Waldencast filed a brief. Looks like a slam dunk, right? Not so fast there, Charlie. Waldencast UK Limited v. Oretia LLC, Opposition No. 91286541 (July 1, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mary Beth Myles).

Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1), provides that an opposer may make a pleaded registration of record by attaching to the notice of opposition “an original or photocopy of the registration prepared and issued by the Office showing both the current status of and current title to the registration, or by a current copy of information from the electronic database records of the Office showing current status and title of the registration." Waldencast did not comply with that rule. It attached a "plain copy" of its pleaded registration to its notice of opposition.

A plain copy of the registration is not sufficient to establish that the registration is currently in force and owned by Opposer because it does not indicate the current status and title of the registration. See Indus. Adhesive Co. v. Borden, Inc., 1983 WL 51985, at *4 (TTAB 1983).

However, "[i]f a pleaded registration issued 'substantially' or 'reasonably' contemporaneous with the filing of the notice of opposition, the undated, plain copy of the registration will be sufficient to establish current status and title of the registration. Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Products, LLC, Opp. No. 91263919, 2022 WL 16646840, at *3-4 (TTAB 2022)." Waldencast’s registration issued on November 9, 2021, more than one year and nine months prior to the filing of the notice of opposition on August 14, 2023. The Board found that the issue date of the registration was not "substantially contemporaneous" with the filing of the notice of opposition, and consequently the registration was not of record.

Inasmuch as Opposer’s pleaded registration is not of record and Opposer presented no admissible testimony or other evidence, and Applicant did not admit Opposer’s entitlement or any facts that might establish it in its answer, there is no record evidence to support Opposer’s real interest in this proceeding or any reasonable basis for its belief of damage. See Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (entitlement to a statutory cause of action must be proven by the plaintiff in every inter partes case) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)).

The Board concluded that Waldencast failed to establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence, and so, the Board dismissed the opposition.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: TTABlog tip: read the Rules. BTW: What is the res judicata effect of this dismissal?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Thursday, July 10, 2025

TTABlog Test: Is NATIVE NATIONS CANNABIS Merely Descriptive of Hemp-Containing Cosmetics?

The USPTO refused to register the mark NATIVE NATIONS CANNABIS , finding it to be merely descriptive of "Cosmetic bath salts; massage oils; cosmetic mud masks; body butter; anti-aging cream; moisturizing creams; bath bombs; and hand lotions; all of the foregoing containing ingredients solely derived from hemp with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis" [CANNABIS disclaimed]. Applicant is "from" the native nation Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe in South Dakota. How do you think this appeal came out? In re FSST Pharms, LLC, Serial No. 97419333 (July 8, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).

The Examining Attorney maintained that NATIVE NATIONS CANNABIS "would immediately convey to consumers not just the information that the goods contain cannabis, but that the goods and/or their cannabis ingredient are produced and/or offered for sale from one of the Native Nations.” She argued that there is a connection between Native Nations and cannabis products, pointing to evidence of a “growing movement of tribes to become involved in the cannabis products industry,” and noting that Applicant has a tribe-based dispensary.

The Board rejected the Examining Attorney’s argument that NATIVE NATIONS describes a particular location of the goods or reflects goods that are grown on a tribal reservation, because the evidence indicated that the term NATIVE NATIONS describes 574 nations within nations in the United States, and not a specific geographic unit or location.

As to the Examining Attorney’s argument that NATIVE NATIONS identifies the grower of a main ingredient of Applicant’s goods (hemp), the record did not establish that average consumers are aware that tribes of native nations are growing cannabis or hemp. As to the argument that NATIVE NATIONS identifies Applicant as a provider or source of the goods, the Board observed that there is no per se rule that a term that identifies the provider or source of the goods is merely descriptive. "Absent evidence, a specific finding standing alone that a term describes the provider or source is insufficient to support a Section 2(e)(1) refusal."

The evidence shows that some consumers may be aware that Applicant is a Native nation, and may be aware that Applicant operates a medical marijuana dispensary, but the record does not support a finding that NATIVE NATIONS immediately conveys to average consumers information about a quality, feature, or characteristic of the identified goods. We find NATIVE NATIONS is not merely descriptive of the identified goods.

And so, the Board reversed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: I don't find this opinion to be convincing, do you? To me, NATIVE NATIONS tells me that the goods come from a native tribe. Shouldn't every tribe be able to use the phrase?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Wednesday, July 09, 2025

TTAB Affirms Five Refusals of SHYFT Marks for Beer and Flavored Malt Beverages: Confusable with SHIFT for Wine

In these five consolidated appeals, the Board upheld the USPTO's Section 2(d) refusals to regsiter the mark SHYFT - in standard character form, in stylized form, and in the form shown immediately below - for beer and flavored malt-based beverages, excluding beer, finding confusion likely with the registered mark SHIFT for wine. There was little dispute over the relatedness of the goods, and the applicant did not address the channels of trade or classes of consumers. Applicant focused the bulk of its argument on the sixth DuPont factor, relying on third-party use and registration of marks containing the word SHIFT. In re Star Catcher LLC, Serial Nos. 97759143, 98032414, 98032430, 98032440, and 98032445 (July 1, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

The Marks: Applicant argued that SHIFT and SHYFT have different connotations because SHYFT, due to the fact that its misspelled with a “Y,” connotes “flavor-shifting qualities,” but the registered (correctly-spelled) SHIFT mark evokes the shifting of a car’s transmission. The Board didn't buy it. First, because there was no evidence to support that argument, and second, because "SHYFT is an easily-recognized misspelling of SHIFT."  The additional, disclaimed language “flavor shifting cocktail” is a descriptive phrase, displayed in a much smaller typeface, and "plays little role in the overall commercial impression of this version of Applicant’s mark."

The Board found Applicant’s SHYFT and Stylized SHYFT marks to be nearly identical to the standard character SHIFT mark in the cited registration. As to the other marks, "[w]ith only a small additional difference, Applicant’s marks fare little better and still are highly similar to the mark in the cited registration."

Sixth DuPont Factor As to applicant's third-party uses, there was no evidence of use of SHIFT marks for "flavored malt-based alcoholic beverages, excluding beers." With respect to beer (e.g., DOWNSHIFT, SPIRIT SHIFT, and SHIFT TRADE) and wine (THE SHIFT, REDSHIFT, SHIFTING LENS), "the differences from Applicant’s mark and the mark in the cited registration detract from the weight we assign the third-party evidence within the wine-and-beer space."

The Board found applicant's third-party registration evidence (SHIFT HAPPENS, NIGHT SHIFT) to be just as "underwhelming." "[N]one of these marks [is] as close to the mark in the cited registration as Applicant’s marks. Second, several of them are unitary marks where the meaning of 'shift' has a specific connotation."

In sum, while we do not find any degree of conceptual weakness in the registered mark, the slight level of commercial weakness shown by Applicant’s third-party use evidence will go on Applicant’s side of the ledger, to be weighed with the other factors in the final weighing.

Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board concluded that confusions is likely, and so it affirmed the refusal to register.

If the first four factors did not so clearly support a conclusion that confusion is likely, a marginal showing of weakness like the one here hypothetically could tip the balance. But this is not such a case. The similarity of the marks here is just too great, and consumers perceive these goods as related. These are usually the most critical factors, and we see nothing indicating that they should not warrant their usual weight here. The classes of customers and trade channels overlap as well. In these circumstances and on this record, the slight weakness Applicant has shown in the term “shift” is nowhere near able to carry the day.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: SHYFT for beer confusable with SHIFT for wine? In the real world, I doubt it.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Tuesday, July 08, 2025

TTABlog Test: Three Recent Section 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness Appeals - How Did They Turn Out?

Last year the Board affirmed about 88% of the Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusals reviewed on appeal. So far this year, the rate is well over 90%. Here are three recent appeals. How do you think they came out? You might respond by asking, what was the evidence? Well, give it a try anyway. [Answer in first comment].

In re Lifetime Brands, Inc., Serial No. 98012956 (June 30, 2025) [Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos]. [Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of SNACKLEBOX for "cutting boards and attached serverware, namely, serving platter with compartments sold together as a unit." Applicant argued that the term is suggestive because it is “a play on the words, ‘snack’ and ‘tackle box’, and does not immediately convey that applicant’s goods feature a cutting board and a serving platter with compartments.”]

In re Lewitt, Hackman, Shapiro, Marshall & Harlan, Serial No. 98115823(July 2, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of JUSTICENTER for “Attorney services; Attorney services, namely, representation of clients in personal injury matters; Legal services." Applicant contended that JUSTICENTER, “as a telescoped mark, has no meaning in and of itself.”]

US Ghost Adventures Llc, Serial No. 98186224 (July 3, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of MURDER HOUSE for "Museum services, namely, exhibiting to the public a historical site” and “Hotel accommodation services.” Applicant argued that MURDER HOUSE could indicate something other than a house where a murder took place, such as a restaurant with food so good diners want to “murder” their meals or a house where crows gather.]

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Monday, July 07, 2025

Precedential No. 6: TTAB Refuses to Add Affirmative Defense of Abandonment but Allows Addition as Counterclaims

In this opposition to registration of the mark JOKER SMOKER, in the form shown below, for smoker's articles and related retail services, the applicant moved for leave to amend its answer to add an affirmative defense of abandonment regarding the opposer's pleaded JOKER registrations. The Board deemed the proposed addition improper, since an abandonment claim is an attack against the validity of the registrations that can be raised only by way of a counterclaim or separate petition for cancellation, not by an affirmative defense. However, the Board allowed applicant 15 days within which to add counterclaims for cancellation of the registrations. Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v. Joker Smoker Shop, Inc. dba Joker Smoker, 2025 USPQ2d 830 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Order by Interlocutory Attorney Michael Webster).

Applicant's proposed affirmative defense alleged that "Opposer has discontinued use of its marks, Registration Nos. 1,087,438, and 2,661,926, for a period of more than three (3) years, with intent not to resume use, and has thereby abandoned use of such marks pursuant to Section 45 of the Lanham Act.” The Board found those allegations to be legally sufficient to support counterclaims for abandonment. Lewis Silkin LLP v. Firebrand LLC, Can. No. 92067378, 2018 WL 6923002, at *4-6 (TTAB 2018) (“The petition to cancel pleads that Respondent is not using the mark with its goods and services, and has no intent to resume use. The Board finds that no more is necessary for a legally sufficient abandonment claim in the context of the Board’s narrow jurisdiction limited to trademark registrability.”).

Further, the Board observed, applicant did not unduly delay in seeking to amend its answer (within two months after receiving amended discovery responses from the opposer). See Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., Opp. No. 91158891, 2007 WL 894416, at *3 (TTAB 2007); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Editoy AG, Opp. No. 91101408, 2006 WL 1258869, at *2 (TTAB 2006) (motion for leave to amend pleading granted because grounds for new claim learned during discovery); see also TBMP § 507.02(a). Opposer did not argue that it would be prejudiced by allowing the amendment (six weeks remained in the discovery period). See, e.g., Topco Holdings, Inc. v. Hand 2 Hand Indus., LLC, Opp. No. 91267988, 2022 WL 157880, at *4 (TTAB 2022) (no undue prejudice when three months remain in discovery). Nor was there any evidence applicant acted in bad faith or had a dilatory motive in seeking leave to amend, and it had not previously amended its pleading.

If Applicant files an amended answer with counterclaims, the Board will construe Applicant’s motion for leave to amend as asking to add properly pleaded counterclaims for abandonment. Accordingly, a decision on the motion for leave to amend is deferred and proceedings remain suspended.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Does this ruling merit the "precedential" tag? If the Board had denied the motion, would applicant simply have filed a new motion to add the counterclaims?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Thursday, July 03, 2025

TTABlog Test: Is BREAK OUT THE BANDIDO Confusable with BANDIT for Overlapping Alcoholic Beverages?

Sutter Home Winery opposed an application to register BREAK OUT THE BANDIDO for "distilled blue agave liquor" (a/k/a tequila) on the ground of likelihood of confusion with its registered mark BANDIT for "alcoholic beverages except beer[s]." The goods are legally identical and presumably travel in the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. But what about the marks? How do you think this came out? Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Roar Spirits, LLC, Opposition No. 91281737 (June 26, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow).

The Board found the BANDIT mark to be conceptually strong. It has achieved "slight commercial strength, but not enough to increase the scope of protection the mark is entitled as an inherently distinctive mark." Applicant Roar Spirit’s evidence of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods did not diminish its strength. The Board, after weeding out marks for unrelated goods and marks not in use in the United States, was left with two third-party registrations and seven third-party uses – Bandito wine, Bandido wine, Cosmic Bandido mead, Bandito’s Blood wine, Bandido de Amores tequila, Goofy Bandit Espressotini liqueur, Barrel Bandit whiskey, and Time Bandit vodka. But there was no evidence as to the extent of use of the third-party marks.

These several Bandit-esque uses, coupled with the two third-party registrations as discussed above, fail to demonstrate a consistent pattern of use of the term ‘BANDIT’” in a manner that would prove that term “has a normally understood and well recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning,”

As for the marks, Opposer Sutter argued that BANDIDO is the dominant element of the opposed mark, but the Board disagreed, finding that BREAK OUT THE BANDIDO is a unitary mark. The Board rejected Sutter's argument that consumers will shorten the mark to BANDIDO when referring to Roar's product.

The Board found that the marks BANDIT and BREAK OUT THE BANDIDO are "very different in overall appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression."

Even if it is known that “bandido” is a synonym of “bandit,” there are still differences in connotation because “bandido” is defined (in MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S) as “an outlaw of Mexican extraction or origin” (consistent with Applicant’s offering of tequila, a Mexican liquor), whereas Opposer’s mark refers generally to an outlaw or robber. Furthermore, and to extent consumers understand the meaning of the word “bandido” as Opposer contends, we again point out that Applicant’s mark is BREAK OUT THE BANDIDO, not BANDIDO. Furthermore, we find some merit to Applicant’s argument that BREAK OUT THE BANDIDO connotes “breaking a prisoner out of jail,”100 which calls to mind breaking an imprisoned Mexican outlaw out of jail.

The Board concluded that "the dissimilarity of the marks in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression is so great as to outweigh the other DuPont factors."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: In 2023, Suttor's assignee of the BANDIT mark suceessfully opposed Roar's application to register EL BANDIDO YANKEE for tequila [TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Wednesday, July 02, 2025

TTAB Reverses 2(e)(2) Geographical Descriptiveness Refusal of BUCKEYE CUSTOM E-BIKES

Finding that the primary significance of the word "BUCKEYE" is not a geographic location, the Board reversed a Section 2(e)(2) refusal of the mark BUCKEYE CUSTOM E-BIKES for "On-line retail store services featuring electric bicycles and electric bicycle accessories; Retail store services featuring electric bicycles and electric bicycle accessories.” However, the Board required a disclaimer of CUSTOM E-BIKES. In re Buckeye Custom E-Bikes, LLC, Serial No. 98321088 (June 27, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).

The test for determining whether a mark is primarily geographically descriptive under Section 2(e)(2) is whether: 1. the mark sought to be registered (or a portion thereof) is the name of a place generally known to the public; 2. the source of the goods or services is the geographic region named in the mark; and 3. the public would make an association between the goods or services and the place named in the mark, that is, believe that the goods or services for which the mark is sought to be registered originate in that place.

Additionally, in order to refuse registration, “the geographical meaning [must be] perceived by the relevant public as the primary meaning and that the geographical significance of the mark is to be assessed as it is used on or in connection with the goods [or services].”

As to the first prong of the test, the Examining Attorney relied on dictionary definitions, third-party registrations, and website references, in maintaining that the term BUCKEYE is a commonly used nickname for the U.S. state of Ohio. As to the second prong, there was no dispute that applicant is located in Ohio. As to the third, because Ohio is generally known to the purchasing public as a state in the United States and applicant’s services originate there, there is a presumption of a services-place association by the public.

Applicant argued that the numerous definitions of “buckeye” submitted by the Examining Attorney invariably define the term BUCKEYE first as a tree or shrub, and second as the seed produced by such a tree or shrub. The Board sided with the applicant.

As demonstrated by the dictionary and website article evidence of record, the term ‘buckeye,” standing alone, is primarily defined as a tree or shrub or the seed from such tree or shrub. The record also shows that the nickname for the state of Ohio is not “buckeye” but the “Buckeye State.” And while the tertiary dictionary definition of “buckeye” is “a native of Ohio,” that definition primarily defines a person, not a geographic location.

The Board concluded that, although the term “buckeye” may be suggestive of the state of Ohio, the evidence demonstrated that the primary significance of BUCKEYE is not that of a geographic location."

The Board ordered that the application be reopened and remanded to the Examining Attorney for entry of the disclaimer of the wording CUSTOM E-BIKES. See Trademark Rule 2.142(g), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g).

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: I think it's fair to say that consumers in Ohio will think that BUCKEYE is a geographical reference. Isn't that enough for a Section 2(e)(2) refusal? In the doctrine of foreign equivalents context, a few hundred thousand foreign language speakers are enough to support a mere descriptiveness refusal of a foreign-language term. Surely there are more than a few hundred thousand people who find BUCKEYE to be geographically descriptive.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Tuesday, July 01, 2025

TTAB Quarterly Index: April - June 2025

E-mail subscriptions to the TTABlog are available. Just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. Please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger at jwelch at wolfgreenfield.com.

Section 2(a) - False Suggestion of a Connection: Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:
Section 2(e)(1) - Mere Descriptiveness:
Section 2(e)(5) - Functionality: Abandonment/Nonuse/Specimen of Use: Dilution: Failure-to-Function:
Genericness: Lack of Bona Fide Intent: Pan-American Convention: Discovery/Evidence/Procedure:
CAFC Decisions: Recommended Reading: Other:

Text © John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Posts July 2025 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled two oral hearings for the month of July 2025. Both will be held virtually. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.


July 22, 2025 - 1 PM [Virtual]: Sueros y Bebidas Rehidratantes, S.A. de C.V. v. Bebidas Electromas S.A. de C.V., Opposition No. 91285906 [Opposition to registration of the mark ELECTROMAS for "food supplements," "Fruit drinks; Mineral water; Preparations for making non-alcoholic fruit-flavored beverages," and "Alcoholic beverages containing fruit; Alcoholic beverages, except beer; Alcoholic cocktail mixes; Prepared alcoholic cocktail," in view of the registered mark ELECTROLIT for, inter alia, sports drinks containing electrolytes, energy drinks, and soft drinks, on the grounds of likelihood of confusion and likelihood of dilution.]

July 29, 2025 - 10 AM [Virtual]: In re VCDF, Serial No. 97795205 [Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of WORLDWIDECRYPTO for "Cryptocurrency exchange services; Cryptocurrency exchange services featuring blockchain technology; Cryptocurrency payment processing; Cryptocurrency trading services."

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Monday, June 30, 2025

Three Recent TTAB Inter Partes Decisions: a Mixed Bag of Defeats for the Plaintiffs

Here for your consideration are three recent Board decisions. The plaintiff lost in each one: for lack of standing, failure to prove priority, and failure to prove lack of bona fide intent.

California Wheel Distributor Inc. v. Peregrine Automotive, LLC., Cancellation No. 92080626 (June 26, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington) [The Board denied this petition for cancellation of a registration of the mark REVENGE AUTO PARTS for “on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring auto parts,” because the petitioner failed to prove its statutory standing. Petitioner alleged nonuse and abandonment and claimed that it had standing to bring the petition because its application to register the mark REVENGE was blocked by the challenged registration. However, it failed to submit a copy of the file history of its application and there was no other supporting evidence.]

Schiebel Industries AG v. Camera Copters, Inc., Cancellation No. 92071596 (June 25, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lawrence T. Stanley, Jr.) [The Board denied this petition for cancellation of the mark CAMERA COPTERS, in word-and-design form, because Petitioner Schiebel failed to prove priority. Schiebel claimed prior common law rights in the mark CAMCOPTER and alleged use of the mark since 2009, but it failed to put its sales figures in competitive context, and its long use of the mark was by itself insufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness for its highly descriptive mark.]

Retrobrands USA LLC v. Data Access Sarl, Opposition No. 91283839 (June 24, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen) [The Board dismissed this six-year-old opposition to registration of the mark HELENE CURTIS for cosmetics and hair care products because Opposer Retrobrands failed to prove its claim that the applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark. The Board found that applicant had shown "both the capacity to market and/or manufacture perfumes and cosmetic-type products, having produced them in the past under different marks." Although applicant did not have a detailed business plan, the Board found that applicant's assertion that it "believes such [a detailed plan] is unnecessary in view of Applicant’s prior experience" was reasonable.]

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Retrobrands has lost several other TTAB cases in its attempts to revive "zombie" marks, including CHICLETS and KINNEY SHOES.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Friday, June 27, 2025

TTABlog Test: Is "USNA" Merely Descriptive of Cosmetics?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark KECA’S USNA for “Cosmetics" because the applicant failed to disclaim the word USNA. There was no dispute between the applicant and Examining Attorney Michael FitzSimons that USNA is a Croation word meaning "lips," but there was a dispute as to whether "Croatian is a common, modern language and whether other West Balkan languages in the standardized Serbian-Croatian language family . . . translate 'USNA' as 'lip,' broadening the number of people in the United States that understand USNA as 'lip' in English." Whether consumers would "stop and translate" the term, and whether the term is merely descriptive of the goods were the remaining issues. How do you think this came out? In re Monica Walls, Serial No. 98049431 (June 25 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).

The Board first found that Croatian is a modern language, since it is spoken in Croatia and elsewhere. As to whether the language is common, "it is enough to demonstrate that an 'appreciable' number of Americans are capable of translating the term USNA from Croatian into English."

“The doctrine should be applied only when it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would ‘stop and translate [the word] into its English equivalent.’” For purposes of the doctrine, the “ordinary American purchaser” includes “all American purchasers, including those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily be expected to translate words into English."
Given that Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian are mutually intelligible among each other and are considered “nearly identical” in vocabulary and grammar, we consider the census and other website information relating to the “Serbo-Croatian” language family probative.

The Board observed that there is no "minimum threshold number of speakers of a foreign language that is required for the language to be considered a “common” one in the United States."

[T]he evidence in the record shows, among other things, there are sizeable global populations of Serbo-Croatian (BCMS) speakers, a significant number of people from Balkan Peninsula countries living in major cities in the United States, evidence that Serbo-Croatian (BCMS) languages are taught by well-known and major U.S. universities, and U.S. census evidence that speakers of the Serbo-Croatian language in the home is over 240,000. Given this evidence, we do not view Croatian as obscure.

The next question was whether the relevant consumer would stop and translate USNA. The Board concluded that USNA has a clear, descriptive meaning in the context of applicant's goods, consumers familiar with the Croatian word USNA likely will focus on that meaning.

The Board noted that under the CAFC's recent VETEMENTS decision, "the burden is on the party opposing translation to show that it is unlikely the ordinary American purchaser would stop and translate the foreign term into its English equivalent."

The Board found that applicant had not met her burden "to show that Croatian is an obscure language or that an American consumer would not stop and translate USNA into its English equivalent, “lip,” in the context of Applicant’s goods."

Finally, the Board found that since applicant's cosmetic products are lipstick or lip gloss, the term "lip" is merely descriptive of applicant's goods.

And so, the Board upheld the disclaimer requirement but gave the applicant thirty days to submit the required disclaimer.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Is this a WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

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